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Abstract—We present an automated verification method for
security of Diffie–Hellman–based key exchange protocols. The
method includes a Hoare-style logic and syntactic checking. The
method is applied to protocols in a simplified version of the
Bellare–Rogaway–Pointcheval model (2000). The security of the
protocol in the complete model can be established automatically
by a modular proof technique of Kudla and Paterson (2005).
I. INTRODUCTION
Key exchange protocols are a very important mechanism
to establish secure communication channels. In general,
conducting security analysis manually for key exchange
is time-consuming and easy to get wrong. Consequently,
formal analysis with tool support has been popular and
successful for at least 20 years. One famous example is when
Lowe [1] used the tool FDR and found an attack against the
Needham–Schroeder public–key protocol, which had been
believed to be secure for many years.
Most protocol analysis tools have treated cryptography in
an idealized manner, using the Dolev–Yao model. Mean-
while, the cryptographic research community has developed
computational models for security of key exchange protocols
and produced numerous proofs by hand. However, manual
security proofs for cryptographic primitives are similarly
easy to get wrong and many flaws in security proofs were
found after the proofs have been published [2], [3]. As a
consequence, automated methods for proof generation and
verification for cryptographic primitives have been consid-
ered a promising advance. So far, little research effort has
been spent for automated proofs for key exchange. This
paper is one step towards filling the gap.
Designing an automated procedure for verifying protocol
security in a powerful cryptographic model is not easy. The
first difficulty is that we need a computational formalism,
i.e. probability and complexity must be included. However,
formal methods have not been applied widely for compu-
tational security models typically used in the cryptographic
research community. The second difficulty is that even if
we can make such a formalism, it may not ease the pain
but could make things more complicated [4]. The main
reason is that a computational adversary is so powerful that
there are many things to be considered together at one time.
Therefore too much formality would cause great complexity
for deriving and understanding the proofs. That is why
the cryptography community has not been so interested in
using formal methods to solve their problems. We take these
obstacles into consideration during this work.
Contribution: In this work, we are interested in au-
tomated verification for security of Diffie–Hellman based
key exchange in the Bellare–Rogaway (BR) model [5],
a typical class of key exchange in a typical model. The
basic idea of our approach is as follows. We define a
programming language for specifying protocols formally.
Then we define an assertion language to describe some
properties that a protocol run may satisfy. We will show
that those properties guarantee the security of the protocol.
Finally, we design a logic to verify if a protocol satisfies
the properties or not. Verification with the logic can be done
automatically. However, the automated verification would be
very complicated if we made it directly for the BR model,
because the adversary is too powerful.
We reduce the complexity of the verification by using
a “divide and conquer” strategy. First, the work is based
on the modular proof technique by Kudla and Paterson
[6], which already divides the manual analysis into separate
steps. The basic idea of their technique is that the analysis
in the Bellare–Rogaway model can be done by using a
simpler model, called cNR-mBR. Consequently, we restrict
the verification to the cNR-mBR model only. Second, our
verification uses a Hoare-style logic, whose basic idea is
verifying a whole algorithm by tracking the state after
each step. It means that the whole analysis is done by
analyzing every step inductively, assuming that protocols are
functional.
Unfortunately, the original Hoare logic is limited to ver-
ifying independent sequential programs, but key exchange
protocols are distributed. In some cases, verifying the al-
gorithm of each party separately is enough to conclude the
security. But, in general, the relation between two parties
must be analyzed in order to conclude the security. To
overcome this problem, we propose a syntactic checking
technique, whose idea is borrowed from the way Hoare
logic has been improved to verify communicating sequen-
tial process [7], [8], [9]. However, we have to adapt the
technique to suit the malicious communicating environment.
We do not syntactically match any received message with a
sent message, because the network is not trusted. Instead,
we syntactically match signing and verifying commands,
because it is unlikely that the adversary can fake a signature.
Last but not least, reasoning using our logic can be fully
automated. We also have implemented a reasoning tool and
tested it on several protocols. The source code is small and
the tool can produce the proofs in a short time.
Related work: Automated proofs in cryptographic mod-
els have attracted a certain interest from previous re-
searchers. One line is to use automated tools designed for
a symbolic, i.e. Dolev-Yao, model and then show that the
resulting proof implies the proof we want in a cryptographic
model. Our work follows a different approach, which is to
make automated proofs directly in cryptographic models. We
will mention here only work in this direction.
Courant et al. [10] designed a Hoare-style logic to ver-
ify computational invariants, e.g. indistinguishability in an
asymmetric encryption scheme. Later, the logic has been
extended to cover symmetric block ciphers by Gagne´ et al.
[11] and has been generalized into Computational Indistin-
guishability Logic by Barthe et al. [12]. Those logics are
different from this one in that they focus on cryptographic
primitives, while this logic is for protocols.
Blanchet [13] designed a variant of pi-calculus to for-
malise games, and developed CryptoVerif, a tool that can
automatically transform games using game-hopping tech-
niques, thereby freeing the human from the mundane parts
of the proof. CryptoVerif can be potentially extended to
cover many types of protocols, but it is hard to make it
fully automated, i.e. manual guidance is required in non-
trivial situations. In addition, CryptoVerif covers only static
corruptions and has not yet been shown to work on Diffie–
Hellman protocols.
Datta et al. [14] tuned the Computational Protocol Com-
position Logic for verifying key exchange protocols, re-
sulting in security proofs in the older version of Bellare–
Rogaway model [15]. The major difference between their
work and ours is that they verify trace properties, whereas
we check non-trace ones. Furthermore, it is not clear how
reasoning in their logic can be automated.
We are not aware of much work that takes advantage of
the simplicity in modular proofs. In earlier work, we have
used the same modular proof as we do here and proposed an
approach to automate proofs [16]. This earlier work linked
a Dolev-Yao model used in an automated tool with the
simplified model. The proof made by the automated tool
implies security in the simplified model, and then security
in the full model can be achieved by compiling the protocol.
The basic idea is the same as in this paper, but the previous
work is different in the way that security proofs of public-
key-based protocols are achieved indirectly, via a Dolev-Yao
tool. In this paper we establish proofs directly for Diffie–
Hellman-based protocols.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows:
• Section 2 explains some preliminaries for the work.
• Section 3 discusses how we model the protocol execu-
tion in an adversarial environment.
• Section 4 defines some properties that a protocol run-
ning in the model may satisfy.
• Section 5 introduces a Hoare-style logic for checking
those properties.
• Section 6 shows how we can additionally use a syntac-
tic checking to improve the result.
• Section 7 describes the implementation of our tool.
• Section 8 concludes the paper.
• The appendix includes proofs for the soundness of the
logic.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section we define some necessary primitives and
their security requirements. Our work covers key exchange
protocols based on the Diffie–Hellman scheme with signa-
ture schemes used to authenticate messages.
A. Diffie–Hellman problems
Let p and q be primes where q|p− 1 and |q| = k, and let
G be a multiplicative subgroup of Z?p of order q. Let g be a
generator of G. Notice that by ga, we mean ga mod p. The
computational, decisional and gap problems of the Diffie–
Hellman instance (p, q, g) are defined as follows.
• Computational Diffie–Hellman problem (CDH)
Given ga, gb ∈ G where a, b∈RZq , output gab.
• Decisional Diffie–Hellman problem (DDH) Given
ga, gb, gc ∈ G where a, b∈RZq , determine whether or
not gc = gab.
• Gap Diffie–Hellman problem (GDH) Given ga, gb ∈
G where a, b∈RZq and an oracle that solves the DDH
problem of G, output gab.
We assume that the above problems are hard, i.e. there is
no probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm to solve
them.
B. Signature Scheme
Definition 1: A signature scheme is a triple of algorithms:
• A PPT algorithm GSig: (pk, sk) ← GSig(1k) where
pk, sk are called public and private keys respectively.
• A PPT algorithm SSig: s← SSig(sk,m) where m, s ∈
{0, 1}∗ and m, s are called message and signature
respectively
• A deterministic PT algorithm VSig such that
VSig(pk,m, s) ∈ {true, false}.
We demand that VSig(pk,m,SSig(sk,m)) = true.
If VSig(pk,m, s) is true then s is a valid signature of m.
Definition 2: A signature scheme is existentially unforge-
able under adaptive chosen message attacks (EF-CMA) if
for every PPT algorithm A, which is given a public key
and a signing oracle, the probability that A produces a valid
signature of a message not previously sent to the signing
oracle is negligible.
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Figure 1. The Bellare–Rogaway model
III. PROTOCOL MODELLING
This section describes how we model a protocol running
in an adversarial environment, what we mean by security,
and a modular proof technique that allows us to simplify
the model. Our work focuses on that simplified model, called
cNR-mBR. We also present a simple programming language
for specifying a protocol in that model.
A. A communication model for key exchange protocols
We define a variant of the Bellare–Rogaway model [5]
for key exchange protocols (see Figure 1). Our model is the
same as the mBR model by Kudla and Paterson [6], except
that we do not consider any corrupted oracle to be fresh
(since we do not model key compromise impersonation).
Let k be the security parameter and U denote the set of
p(k) participant IDs, each of which may have up to o(k)
instances. We use ΠiU to denote the oracle of the i
th instance
of U . Every ΠiU has a partner ID pid, which is the ID of
another arbitrary party.
How a party oracle behaves depends on the protocol
specification, defined by two algorithms I(isk) : ci and
R(rsk) : cr, which are initiator and responder code re-
spectively. Each party oracle executes only one of these
algorithms once and uses the output isk or rsk as its session
key (for more details, see Section III-D).
At any time, an oracle ΠiU is in one of the following
states:
• Accepted: When the oracle has received a set of
properly constructed messages to make a session key
and the oracle accepts the key. It holds a role role ∈
{initiator , responder}, a session ID sid and a session
key seskey , which is the output of the executed algo-
rithm, i.e. I(isk) or R(rsk).
• Rejected: When the oracle has decided not to establish
a session key and has aborted the protocol.
• Revealed: When the oracle has answered a Reveal
query from the adversary.
• Corrupted: When the oracle has answered a Corrupt
query from the adversary.
• State *: An oracle is in this state if it is not in any state
above.
Partnership.: Two oracles ΠiU , holding
seskeyΠiU , sidΠiU , pidΠiU and Π
i
V , holding
seskeyΠjV
, sidΠjV
, pidΠjV
are said to be partners if
they have accepted and:
1) sidΠiU = sidΠjV , seskeyΠiU = seskeyΠjV , pidΠiU =
V , pidΠjV = U ;
2) roleΠiU = initiator and roleΠjV = responder or vice
versa;
3) no other oracle has accepted with session ID equals
sidΠiU .
Freshness.: An oracle ΠiU is fresh if it and its partner
ΠjV (if any) are not in the state Revealed and neither U nor
V is in the state Corrupted.
Protocol execution.: The execution of the protocol is
modelled by the following experiment. There are a chal-
lenger C and an adversary E. C maintains a string pubinf ,
which will be given to E. Given an EF-CMA signature
scheme (GSig , SSig , VSig) and a random oracle H , C
executes the following initial steps:
1) Preparing Diffie–Hellman–based keys: C creates a
Diffie–Hellman instance (p, q, g) (as explained in Sec-
tion II-A). Then for each party U , C picks a random
secret dhseckey as the secret key, makes gdhseckey as
the public key dhpubkey. C makes (p, q, g), dhseckey
of U and dhpubkey of V accessible to any oracle ΠiU ,
whose partner is V .
2) Preparing signature keys: For each party U , C runs
GSig on input 1k to get a pair (sigseckey, sigpubkey).
C makes sigseckey of U and sigpubkey of V acces-
sible to any oracle ΠiU , whose partner is V .
3) Preparing public information: First, for every party
U , its dhpubkey and sigpubkey are added into
pubinf . Second, for every oracle ΠiU , its pid is added
into pubinf . Thirdly, the generated Diffie–Hellman
instance (p, q, g) is added into pubinf . Finally, the
algorithms GDH , GSig, SSig, VSig, the random oracle
H and the string pubinf are made available for all
party oracles and the adversary.
4) Starting the experiment: C starts the adversary E and
allows it to query party oracles.
Now E can make the following queries.
• Send(U, i,M): E gives the oracle ΠiU a message M .
ΠiU assumes that M is from its partner and acts
according to the protocol. For initiating an oracle ΠiU ,
E can make a special Send query λ, which tells ΠiU
to set its role = initiator and executes the code for
initiator, i.e. I(isk). If ΠiU did not receive a message
λ as the first message, role is set to be responder and
the code for responder, i.e. R(rsk), will be executed.
• Reveal(U, i): E uses this query to obtain the session
key of ΠiU (if any).
• Corrupt(U): This allows E to learn U ’s long-term
keys, i.e. dhseckey and sigseckey.
• Test(U, i): Only once during the experiment, E can
make a Test query to an oracle ΠiU , which must be
in Accepted state, still fresh and already terminated.
Then C chooses a random bit b. If b = 0 then ΠiU
outputs a randomly chosen session key, otherwise it
outputs its real session key, which is the output of the
terminated algorithm, i.e. I(isk) or R(rsk). E can
continue querying, but not reveal or corrupt the test
oracle or its partner.
Finally, E outputs his guess b′ for b. E’s advantage,
denoted as AdvantageE(k), is |1/2− Pr[b′ = b]|.
Remark 1: Party oracles communicate through the adver-
sary and do not share any variable, so they are message-
driven. We assume that there is only one party oracle
that is active at one time. Whenever the adversary asks a
Send(U, i,M) query, ΠiU is active until it finishes processing
M and terminates, or rejects, or becomes inactive, waiting
for the next message. After that, it is up to the adversary to
activate another party oracle by making a new Send query.
B. Definition of Security
A benign adversary is one who just relays messages
between parties without any modification. Then security for
authenticated key exchange (AKE) is defined as follows.
Definition 3: Given a security parameter k, a protocol is
a secure AKE protocol if:
1) in the presence of a benign adversary, two oracles
running the protocol accept and hold the same session
key and session ID, and the session key is distributed
uniformly at random on {0, 1}k; and
2) for any adversary E, AdvantageE(k) is negligible.
C. A modular proof
The idea of modular proof by Kudla and Paterson [6] is
essential for our work. Following that technique, a protocol
Π defined in the full model described above can be first
proven secure in the simpler model called cNR–mBR. (The
name cNR–mBR, stands for “computational Non-Reveal
modified Bellare Rogaway”. The simpler model requires the
adversary to solve a computational rather than a decisional
problem, without using any Reveal queries.) Then we can
promote such a protocol to one secure in the full model as
long as the protocol Π produces a session string which is
input to a hash function, modelled as a random oracle, to
finally compute a hashed session key.
Definition 4: [6] If Π is a key exchange protocol and
there exists an adversary E, who participates in the above
experiment with Π, and with non-negligible probability (in
security parameter k) can make any two oracles ΠiU and
ΠjV accept and hold the same session key when they are not
partners, then we say the Π has weak partnering. Otherwise
Π has strong partnering.
Note that we can always ensure a protocol Π has strong
partnering by adding the partnering information, i.e. session
IDs and partner IDs [6].
Definition 5: Suppose Π is a key exchange protocol. The
session string decisional problem for protocol Π is: given
all information accessible to ΠiU except the Diffie–Hellman
secret key dhseckey, ΠiU ’s transcript TΠiU and a string s,
decide whether s is the session string of ΠiU or not.
Definition 6: The cNR–mBR model is the same as the
model above, except:
• the adversary cannot make any Reveal query;
• instead of a normal Test query, the adversary selects
an accepted and fresh oracle ΠiU , whose session key is
seskey, and outputs seskey′. Then AdvantageE(k) =
Pr[seskey′ = seskey].
In order to use the cNR–mBR model, given a protocol Π,
we define a protocol pi to be the same as Π, except that the
session string of Π is the session key of pi.
Theorem 1: [6] Suppose that a key exchange protocol Π
uses a hash function H to compute a hashed session key
on completion of the protocol and Π has strong partnering.
If the cNR–mBR-security of the related protocol pi is prob-
abilistic polynomial time reducible to the hardness of the
CDH problem, and the session string decisional problem for
Π is polynomial time reducible to the decisional problem of
f , then the security of Π is probabilistic polynomial time
reducible to the hardness of the GDH problem, assuming
that H is a random oracle.1
This modular proof makes our work easier. From now
on, we just focus on the cNR–mBR model. The security
of a protocol can be established later by adding partnering
information, i.e. session IDs and partner IDs [6], and hashing
the session key.
D. Protocol specification in the cNR–mBR model
In Section III-A we have shown how we model the
communication between party oracles. That model is the
same for every protocol. However, party oracles of different
protocols act differently, depending on the protocol spec-
ifications. In this section we define a simple programming
language for specifying protocol in a formal way. Notice that
the language is for the cNR–mBR model, therefore there will
be no command for hashing.
A protocol specification pi is defined as pi = (I(isk) :
ci,R(rsk) : cr), where I(isk) : ci and R(rsk) : cr
are the initiator and responder algorithm respectively. When
executed, I(isk) or R(rsk) runs every command inside it
and the value of isk or rsk will be used as the session key.
1By CDH and GDH problems, we mean the CDH and GDH problems
of the Diffie–Hellman instance (p, q, g) used in the experiment.
Syntax Informal description
Command c ::= x := mkDHSec() make a DH secret value, i.e. a nonce
| y := mkDHPub(x) compute a DH public value, i.e. ga where a is a nonce
| z := mkDHKey(y, x) compute a DH key, i.e. gab where a, b are nonces
| x, y := getStaticDHKey() return pre-generated DH secret and public values
| x, y := getIDs() return the oracle and its partner’s IDs
| x := sign(l) x is a signature when we sign the list l of variables
| verisign(l, x) verify if x is a signature of the list l of variables
| z := concat(x, y) z is concatenation of x and y
| z := add(x, y) z = x + y
| z := multiply(x, y) z = x ∗ y
| send(l) | receive(l) send or receive a list of variables
| c; c a sequence of commands
Party oracle code O ::= N (x) : c An oracle N with x is the output after executing c
where
• c is a command.
• x, y, z are programming variables.
• l is a list of programming variables.
Table I
SYNTAX OF PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION
1) Specification syntax: The syntax of the language is
defined in Table I. To avoid confusion, we require that the
initiator and responder codes of a protocol use disjoint sets
of variable names. The language allows us to express pro-
tocols based on the basic flow of the original DH protocol,
but enhanced by an authentication mechanism (signature or
public key). However, the language does not yet support
hashing commands, which may allow us to express protocol
based on NAXOS [17] or HMQV [18]. We leave it to future
work.
I(isk) :
ir := mkDHSec();
igr := mkDHPub(ir);
send(igr);
receive(rgr1);
is, ip := getStaticDHKey();
isk1 := mkDHKey(rgr1, is);
isk2 := mkDHKey(ip, ir);
isk := concat(isk1, isk2);
R(rsk) :
receive(igr1);
rr := mkDHSec();
rgr := mkDHPub(rr);
send(rgr);
rs, rp := getStaticDHKey();
rsk1 := mkDHKey(rp, rr);
rsk2 := mkDHKey(igr1, rs);
rsk := concat(rsk1, rsk2);
Table II
PROTOCOL 4 OF BLAKE-WILSON et al. [19] IN OUR PROGRAMMING
LANGUAGE
Example 1: The “no-hashing” version of the protocol 4
of Blake-Wilson et al. [19], denoted by pi4, is written is our
programming language in Table II.
2) Semantics of the commands: Now we describe for-
mally how an oracle ΠiU behaves, given a protocol specifi-
cation. The semantics of a command is defined by showing
how it affects the current local state of a party oracle.
Recall that the following information is accessible
to party oracle ΠiU : its own ID oid, the partner
ID pid, DH-related information (p, q, g), dhseckey
and dhpubkey partner, signature-related information
sigseckey, sigpubkey partner, and two algorithms SSig,
VSig. Let orcinf denote all of this information.
In addition to programming variables, each party oracle
ΠiU maintains some auxiliary variables, which provide in-
formation for a security reduction in next sections:
• rejected: This variable can be true or false. It is to
know whether ΠiU has rejected or not.
• N: This is the set of nonces generated by ΠiU (including
the static DH secret key). It tells us what values may
not be given when we make a reduction from a protocol
to the CDH problem.
• T: This variable holds all the messages sent/received
by ΠiU and all the DH public values generated by Π
i
U ,
in chronological order. It tells us what values will be
given when we make a reduction from a protocol to the
CDH problem.
An oracle state S of a party oracle is a map from any
variable (both programming and auxiliary variables) to a
string in {0, 1}∗. A command executed by ΠiU will transit
the current oracle state S of ΠiU to a distribution of new
oracle states. Given an oracle state S, let S(x) denote the
bitstring value kept in the storage of the variable x and
S[x 7→ u] denote that the value of x is set to be u. These
notations are extended to a list of variables l in a similar
way. Notice that ΠiU can execute a command iff its variable
rejected is not true. The transition is defined formally
(together with informal explanations) in Table III.
IV. AN ASSERTION LANGUAGE
In the previous section we have defined an experiment
for key exchange. During the experiment, every party oracle
changes from one local state to another after executing
every command. If we could deal with oracle local states
Jx := mkDHSec()K(S, orcinf ) = [u r← Z∗p : S[x 7→ u,N 7→ (S(N) ∪ {u}),T 7→ (S(T), gu)]
(u is chosen randomly, x evaluates to u, then N,T are updated)
Jy := mkDHPub(x)K(S, orcinf ) = S[y 7→ gS(x))]
(y evaluates to gx)
Jz := mkDHKey(y, x)K(S, orcinf ) = S[z 7→ S(y)S(x)]
(z evaluates to yx)
Jx, y := getStaticDHKey()K(S, orcinf ) = S[x 7→ dhseckey, y 7→ dhpubkey partner, ,N 7→ (S(N) ∪ {dhseckey}),T 7→ (S(T), gdhseckey)]
(x evaluates to the DH secret key, y evaluates to the partner’s DH public key)
Jx, y := getIDs()K(S, orcinf ) = S[x 7→ oid, y 7→ pid]
(x evaluates to the oracle ID, y evaluates to its partner’s ID)
Jx := sign(l)K(S, orcinf ) = S[x 7→ SSig(sigseckey, S(l))]
(x evaluates to a signature, signed on l)
Jverisign(l, x)K(S, orcinf ) = { S[rejected 7→ true] if v = false, where v ← VSig(sigpubkey partner, S(l), S(x))
S otherwise
(verify if x is a signature signed by the partner on l or not )
Jz := concat(x, y)K(S, orcinf ) = S[z 7→ S(x)||S(y)]
(z evaluates to the concatenation of x and y)
Jz := add(x, y)K(S, orcinf ) = S[z 7→ (S(x) + S(y)) mod p]
(z evaluates to x + y)
Jz := multiply(x, y)K(S, orcinf ) = S[z 7→ (S(x) ∗ S(y)) mod p]
(z evaluates to x ∗ y)
Jsend(l)K(S, orcinf ) = S[T 7→ S(T, l)]
(T is updated. The content S(l) is given to the adversary as the answer for the most recent adversarial query Send(U, i,M).)
Jreceive(l)K(S, orcinf ) = { S[l 7→M,T 7→ S(T, l)] if |M | = |l|
S[rejected 7→ true] otherwise
. (The oracle ΠiU becomes inactive and waits until it is reactivated by a new Send(U, i,M) command from the adversary (see Remark 1). l evaluates to
M .)
Jc1; c2K(S, orcinf ) = Jc2K(Jc1K(S, orcinf ), orcinf )
(c2 is executed after c1)
JN (x) : cK(S, orcinf ) = JcK(S, orcinf ).
(Executing the algorithm N means executing c and x is the output)
Table III
SEMANTICS OF THE PROGRAMMING LANGUAGE
separately, the assertion language would be pretty as simple
as a typical Hoare-style logic. Unfortunately, the adver-
sary interacts with a set of algorithms running in parallel,
therefore we must consider global invariants. We define an
experiment state to be the set of isolated states of all party
oracles. Since every party oracle is probabilistic, at every
moment, the experiment is in a probabilistic state, i.e. a
distribution of states. We will show that if the way a protocol
changes the experiment state satisfies some properties, then
the protocol security is reduced to CDH problem.
There are several points to be considered to make the
assertion language formally captures the properties that
guarantee a reduction. First, we must be able to simulate
any party oracle, without using any nonce (DHSim). Second,
a DH public value that oracle receives must be from an
honest oracle (DHPubOut).Third, when the adversary gives
the session key, we must be able to solve the CDH problem
(DHSol). DHSec and DHPubIn are used only to establish
other predicates.
A. Syntax
ψ ::= DHSec(ΠiU ; x; bv) | DHPubIn(ΠiU ; y) |
DHPubOut(ΠiU ; y) | DHSol(ΠiU ; z; y; x) |
DHSim(ΠiU ; gv)
ϕ ::= true | ψ | ϕ ∧ ϕ
where
• ΠiU is the i
th instance of party U .
• x, y, z are variables used in party oracles.
• bv and gv are sets of variables (bv and gv stand for
“bad variables” and “good variables”).
B. Semantics
The semantics of an assertion ϕ is defined by showing
when a distribution of experiment states X satisfies ϕ,
written X |= ϕ. To avoid ambiguity, we write [x]ΠiU for
the variable x inside the party oracle ΠiU .
2
• X |= true.
• X |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff X |= ϕ1 and X |= ϕ2.
• X |= DHSec(ΠiU ; x; bv) iff there exists an algorithm B
such that
Pr[S
r← X : φ1 ∧ φ2] is overwhelming,
where φ1 and φ2 are respectively S([x]ΠiU ) ∈ S([N]ΠiU ) and
B((S([N,T]ΠiU ) \{S([x]ΠUi )}), pubinf ) = S([vars\bv]ΠiU )
with [vars]ΠUi is the set of all variables in Π
i
U .
Informally, φ1 means that the variable x of ΠiU has been
assigned a nonce. φ2 means that if we are given the set
N of nonces (except the nonce stored in x), the current
transcript and all public information, we can still compute
every variable in vars except ones in the set bv.
• X |= DHPubIn(ΠiU ; y) iff there exists an algorithm B such
that
Pr[S
r← X,n← B(S([y,N]ΠiU )) : φ1 ∧ φ2] is overwhelming.
where φ1 is S([y]ΠiU ) = g
n and φ2 is n ∈ S([N]ΠiU )
Informally, φ1 means y = gn where φ2 means that n is a
nonce accessible by ΠiU .
• X |= DHPubOut(ΠiU ; y) iff
Pr[S
r←X, j r←{1, · · · , o(k)}, n r←S([N]ΠjV ) :S([y]ΠiU ) = g
n]
is non-negligible,
where V is ΠiU ’s partner and o(k) is the number of
instances of a party.
Informally, this predicate means that the variable y inside
ΠiU must equal g
n where n is a nonce used in one instance
of ΠiU ’s partner.
• X |= DHSol(ΠiU ; z; y; x) iff there exists an algorithm B
such that
Pr[S
r← X,m = S([y]ΠiU ), n = S([x]ΠiU ) : φ1 ∧ φ2]
2Note that every party oracle uses the same protocol specification with
the same set of variable names.
is overwhelming, where φ1 is S([x]ΠiU ) ∈ S([N]ΠiU ) and φ2
is B(S([N]ΠiU ) \{S([x]ΠUi )}, S([z,T]ΠiU ), pubinf ) = mn.
Informally, φ1 means that x is a nonce, while φ2 means that
given z, all nonces (except x), the current transcript and all
public information, we can output yx. In other words, we
can solve a DH instance with challenge values y and gx.
• X |= DHSim(ΠiU ; gv) iff there exist two algorithms B and
B′ such that
Pr[S
r← X, x r← T.snd : φ1 ∧ φ2] is overwelming, where
• φ1 is B(S([T.pre(x)]ΠiU ), pubinf ) = S([x]ΠUi )
• φ2 is B′(S([T]ΠiU ), pubinf ) = S([gv]ΠUi )].
• T.snd denotes the list obtained by projecting T to all
messages sent from ΠiU .
• T.pre(x) denotes the part of T from the beginning to
before x.
Informally, φ1 means that we can always simulate the party
oracle ΠiU . It says that we can always compute any sent
message using the public information and the part before
the message in the transcript, which also includes all DH
public values generated before the message.
On the other hand, φ2 is just to keep track of the variables
we can simulate. It says that all variables in gv can be
computed without using any DH secret values but just the
transcript, which also includes all DH public values and all
public information. This is useful because when an oracle
sends a message, it must be the current gv for the current
DHSim continues to hold.
C. Link between the invariants and the security definition
As we have explained about the choice of the assertion
language in the beginning of Section IV, we define our in-
variants so that they imply the security of analyzed protocols,
i.e. a security reduction is guaranteed. Now we explain the
link between the invariant and the reduction in more details.
Definition 7: A protocol pi satisfies ϕ1[c]ΠiUϕ2, written
pi |= ϕ1[c]ΠiUϕ2 iff for any party oracle ΠiU and any
adversary E the following statement holds:
If ΠiU starts executing c from a distribution of experiment
states that satisfies ϕ1 and after that ΠiU is still fresh and not
in the state Rejected, then the distribution of new experiment
states satisfies ϕ2.
Lemma 1: If a distribution of experiment states satisfies
ϕ which has ΠiU as its first argument, then as long as Π
i
U
does not execute any more commands while the adversary
and other oracles are still running, the new distributions of
experiment states always satisfy ϕ.
Proof: We have five possible cases. If ϕ is one of
DHSec(ΠiU ; x; bv), DHPubIn(Π
i
U ; y), DHSol(Π
i
U ; z; y; x)
or DHSim(ΠiU ; gv), then ϕ is related to the local state of
ΠiU only. Therefore if the local state remains unchanged,
then new distributions of experiment states still satisfy ϕ.
Only if ϕ is DHPubOut(ΠiU ; y), then ϕ is related to
variables outside ΠiU . However, for ϕ to be satisfied we
only require that: with non-negligible probability the variable
y inside ΠiU equals g
n where n is a nonce used in one
instance of ΠiU ’s partner. And because values of variables
are unchanged once they are created, DHPubOut(ΠiU ; y) is
still satisfied.
Now we are ready to define the main theorem of our work.
Theorem 2: Suppose we have a functional protocol pi =
(I(isk) : ci,R(rsk) : cr). If pi satisfies the following
statements:
• {DHSim(ΠiU ; ∅)}[I(isk) : ci]Πi
U
{DHSim(ΠiU ; gv) ∧
DHSol(ΠiU ; isk; y; x) ∧ DHPubOut(ΠiU ; y)} for some
variables x, y and a set gv of variables;
• {DHSim(ΠiU ; ∅)}[R(rsk) : cr]Πi
U
{DHSim(ΠiU ; gv′) ∧
DHSol(ΠiU ; rsk; y
′; x′) ∧ DHPubOut(ΠiU ; y′)} for some
variables x′, y′ and a set gv′ of variables;
then the cNR–mBR security of pi is probabilistic polyno-
mial time reducible to the hardness of the CDH.
Proof: Now we show that given the adversary E whose
AdvantageE(k) is non-negligible, we can construct an
adversary D who can solve any CDH instance with non-
negligible probability. Suppose that D gets ga, gb from the
CDH instance, now D has to output gab.
The intuition of the proof is as follows. We will inject
ga, gb into two party oracles, where the second one is a
partner instance of the first one. DHSim predicates guarantee
that we can simulate them correctly. DHSol and DHPubOut
guarantee that later on we can get gab from the session key of
the first oracle (the session key will be given by the adversary
as defined in the experiment).
The reduction works as follows. D runs the challenger
C as defined. After all setting-up steps have been done, D
chooses randomly a party oracle ΠiU , whose partner is V .
During the experiment, if ΠiU becomes unfresh, then D gives
up. But with a non-negligible probability ΠiU remains fresh
until the end of the experiment (because E must keep at least
one oracle fresh). We assume that ΠiU remains fresh until
the end of the experiment. D decides randomly to simulate
ΠiU as an initiator or responder
3. The probability that D
chooses the correct role for ΠiU is 1/2. Assume that D
chooses correctly, there will be two cases here.
• The first case happens with probability 1/2 where
D chooses ΠiU to be an initiator. Π
i
U executes the
initiator code as normally with two exceptions. The
first exception is that ΠiU executes as if x has the
value a, i.e. we use ga when necessary and skip any
3D has to decide it beforehand because the simulation may start from the
step Preparing Diffie–Hellman–based keys, e.g. when an injected nonce
is a static DH key
command that requires a. Meanwhile, notice that pi |=
{DHSim(ΠiU ; ∅)}[I(isk) : ci]ΠiU {DHSim(ΠiU ; gv)},
i.e. there is an algorithm B1 that can compute any sent
message using the public information and the previous
transcript. The second exception is that D uses B1 to
compute messages that are sent out (B1 must have
enough information to operate because we have ga,
i.e. the previous transcript is always built correctly).
On the other hand, D picks a random instance ΠjV ,
where V is ΠiU ’s partner. Then b replaces another nonce
uniformly chosen in ΠjV likes a does in Π
i
U . Note
that we can also still compute any sent message from
ΠjV regardless that Π
j
V is an initiator or responder,
because we also have pi |= {DHSim(ΠjV ; ∅)}[R(rsk) :
cr]ΠjV
{DHSim(ΠjV ; gv′). Overall, with an overwhelm-
ing probability, ΠiU is simulated correctly where x has
the value a, and ΠjV is also simulated correctly where
one of its nonces is b. It means that with a non-
negligible probability, E will output the correct session
key of the test oracle (because AdvantageE(k) is non-
negligible in the normal experiment).
Assume that E wins the experiment, the
probability that E chooses ΠiU to test is
1
p(k)o(k) . Also, because the experiment is
simulated correctly with an overwhelming
probability and pi |= {DHSim(ΠiU ; ∅)}[I(isk) :
ci]ΠiU {DHPubOut(ΠiU ; y)}, y must have the
value gb with a non-negligible probability.
Assuming that E chooses ΠiU to test,
because pi |= {DHSim(ΠiU ; ∅)}[I(isk) :
ci]ΠiU {DHSol(ΠiU ; isk; y; x)}, we can always have an
algorithm B2 that given S([isk]Πui ) can output the
value of S([y]ΠUi )
S([x]
ΠU
i
)
, which equals gab with a
non-negligible probability. To sum up, we can extract
the value gab with a non-negligible probability finally.
• The second case happens also with probability 1/2
where D chooses ΠiU to be a responder. Everything
happens in the same way as in the first case.
It means that D can solve any CDH instance with non-
negligible probability. That concludes the proof.
V. PROOF SYSTEM
So far we have explained what we want to know, but not
how to find it. Although we know that if some invariants hold
then our protocol is secure, we have not shown how to check
if those invariants hold or not. In this section we develop
a proof system, which allows us to verify the invariants.
Firstly, we build a set of axioms, i.e. statements that are
always true. Then, we show some inference rules, which
allow us to reason on a protocol specification, i.e. find new
knowledge using the set of axioms.
Our proof system follows the idea of Hoare logic which
has been used to verify sequential programs. Note that party
oracles execute their sequential code locally without any
shared variable, but they communicate via a network. Our
logic is sound even when we verify each party specifica-
tion separately, i.e. an invariant for a party oracle can be
established no matter what the adversary and other oracles
do. This is important because it makes reasoning simple.
However, since a protocol is an agreement between two
parties, if we verify each one without considering the other,
what the logic can verify is limited. In Section VI we will
discuss the solution for this problem.
A. Axioms
Table IV presents a set of axioms, which tell us how the
experiment state changes after a command is executed. They
do not depend on any specific protocol. The axioms follow
the form ϕ1[c]ΠiUϕ2, from Definition 7, where c is only one
command.
Lemma 2: The axioms given in Table IV are sound.
Proof: Proofs are given in Appendix A.
B. Proof rules
The following Sequential Composition rule can be used
for reasoning using the axioms above.
• (P SC1)
{ϕ1}[c1]ΠiU {ϕ2} {ϕ2}[c2]ΠiU {ϕ3}
{ϕ1}[c1; c2]ΠiU {ϕ3}
Lemma 3: The Sequential Composition rule is sound.
Proof: Because {ϕ1}[c1]ΠiU {ϕ2} and {ϕ2}[c2]ΠiU {ϕ3}
hold, we only have to show that after ΠiU executes c1,
and stops in a distribution of states that satisfies ϕ2, the
distribution of states continues to satisfy ϕ2 until ΠiU starts
to execute c2. This is true according to Lemma 1.
Example 2: The proof outline for pi4 in Example 1 is
presented as follows (for readability, unnecessary predicates
are removed).
Initiator:
DHSim(ΠiU ; ∅)
1) [ir := mkDHSec(); ]ΠiU
DHSim(ΠiU ; ∅) ∧ DHSec(ΠiU ; ir; ir)
2) [igr := mkDHPub(ir); ]ΠiU
DHSim(ΠiU ; {igr ∧ DHSec(ΠiU ; ir; ir)})
3) [send(igr); ]ΠiU
DHSim(ΠiU ; {igr ∧ DHSec(ΠiU ; ir; ir)})
4) [receive(rgr1); ]ΠiU
DHSim(ΠiU ; {igr, rgr1 ∧ DHSec(ΠiU ; ir; ir)})
5) [is, ip := getStaticDHKey(); ]ΠiU
DHSim(ΠiU ; {igr, rgr1, ip}) ∧
DHSec(ΠiU ; ir; ir) ∧ DHPubOut(ΠiU ; ip)
6) [isk1 := mkDHKey(rgr1, is); ]ΠiU
DHSim(ΠiU ; {igr, rgr1, ip}) ∧
DHSec(ΠiU ; ir; ir) ∧ DHPubOut(ΠiU ; ip)
I(isk) :
ir := mkDHSec();
igr := mkDHPub(ir);
send(igr);
receive(rgr1);
isk := mkDHKey(rgr1, ir);
R(rsk) :
receive(igr1);
rr := mkDHSec();
rgr := mkDHPub(rr);
send(rgr);
rsk := mkDHKey(igr1, rr);
Table V
THE ORIGINAL DIFFIE–HELLMAN PROTOCOL
7) [isk2 := mkDHKey(ip, ir); ]ΠiU
DHSim(ΠiU ; {igr, rgr1, ip}) ∧
DHPubOut(ΠiU ; ip) ∧ DHSol(ΠiU ; isk2; ip; ir)
8) [isk := concat(isk1, isk2); ]ΠiU
DHSim(ΠiU ; {igr, rgr1, ip}) ∧
DHPubOut(ΠiU ; ip) ∧ DHSol(ΠiU ; isk; ip; ir)
with the rules fired in each step as follows
1) A NG2, A IMP1 and A NG1.
2) A PVG2 and A PVG1.
3) A SND1 and A SND2.
4) A RCV1 and A RCV2.
5) A GSK2, A GSK3 and A GSK1.
6) A KG2 three times.
7) A KG2 twice and A KG1.
8) A CON4, A CON7 and A CON1.
It means pi4 satisfies
{DHSim(ΠiU ; ∅)}[I(isk) : ci]Πi
U
{DHSim(ΠiU ; {igr, rgr1, ip})
∧ DHPubOut(ΠiU ; ip) ∧ DHSol(ΠiU ; isk; ip; ir)}
Responder: Similarly, we can make the conclusion
that pi4 satisfies
{DHSim(ΠiU ; ∅)}[R(rsk) : cr]Πi
U
{DHSim(ΠiU ; {igr1, rgr, rp})
∧ DHPubOut(ΠiU ; rp) ∧ DHSol(ΠiU ; rsk; rp; rr)}
Conclusion: According to the Theorem 2, these results
imply that the security of pi4 in the cNR–mBR model is
reducible to the CDH problem. Furthermore, according to
Theorem 1, the security of the compiled version of pi4 is
reducible to the GDH problem.
Remark 2: The security of the original protocol 4 was
not proved in [19]. The compiled version of pi4 here is
a bit different from the original one, since the partnering
information is added. However, one can prove that protocol
4 already has strong partnering.
Example 3: We try the logic with the original Diffie–
Hellman protocol, specified in Table V. We can see that
the verification result below does not satisfy the security
conditions, i.e. a DHPubOut predicate is missing.
{DHSim(ΠiP , {})}
[I(isk)]ΠiP
{DHPubIn(ΠiP , igr) ∧ DHSec(ΠiP , ir, {ir, isk})
∧ DHSol(ΠiP , isk, rgr1, ir)
∧ DHSim(ΠiP , {igr, rgr1})}
Description Rule
ID
Rule
Nonce
generation
A NG1 {true}[x := mkDHSec()]Πi
U
{DHSec(ΠiU ; x; {x})}
A NG2 {ϕ}[x := mkDHSec()]Πi
U
{ϕ} if ϕ is a DHPubIn, DHPubOut, DHSol, DHSim predicate, or DHSec(ΠiU ; x′; bv) where
x′ is not x.
DH public
value
generation
A PVG1 {DHSec(ΠiU ; x; bv)}[y := mkDHPub(x)]ΠiU {DHPubIn(Π
i
U ; y) ∧ DHSec(ΠiU ; x; bv)}
A PVG2 {DHSim(ΠiU ; gv)}[y := mkDHPub(x)]ΠiU {DHSim(Π
i
U ; gv ∪ {y})}
A PVG3 {ϕ}[y := mkDHPub(x)]Πi
U
{ϕ} if ϕ is a DHSec, DHPubIn, DHPubOut or DHSol predicate
DH shared
key
generation
A KG1 {DHSec(ΠiU ; x; bv)}[z := mkDHKey(y, x)]ΠiU {DHSec(Π
i
U ; x; bv ∪ {z}) ∧ DHSol(ΠiU ; z; y; x)}
A KG2 {DHSim(ΠiU ; gv)}[z := mkDHKey(y, x)]ΠiU {DHSim(Π
i
U ; gv ∪ {z})} if x, y ∈ gv
A KG3 {ϕ}[z := mkDHKey(y, x)]Πi
U
{ϕ} if ϕ is a DHPubIn, DHPubOut, DHSol, DHSim(ΠiU ; gv) predicate, where x /∈ gv
or DHSec(ΠiU ; x
′; bv), where x′ is not x
Static
pre-computed
DH keys
A GSK1 {true}[y, x := getStaticDHKey()]Πi
U
{DHSec(ΠiU ; x; {x}) ∧ DHPubOut(ΠiU ; y)}
A GSK2 {DHSim(ΠiU ; gv)}[y, x := getStaticDHKey()]ΠiU {DHSim(Π
i
U ; gv ∪ {y})}
A GSK3 {ϕ}[y, x := getStaticDHKey()]Πi
U
{ϕ} if ϕ is a DHPubIn, DHPubOut, DHSol or DHSec(ΠiU ; x′; bv) where x′ is
not x predicate.
oracles ID
A GID1 {DHSim(ΠiU ; gv)}[x, y := getIDs()]ΠiU {DHSim(Π
i
U ; gv ∪ {x, y})}
A GID2 {ϕ}[x, y := getIDs()]Πi
U
{ϕ} if ϕ is a DHSec, DHPubIn, DHPubOut or DHSol predicate
Signing
A SGN1 {DHSim(ΠiU ; gv)}[x := sign(l)]ΠiU {DHSim(Π
i
U ; gv ∪ {x})} if l ⊆ gv
A SGN2 {DHSim(ΠiU ; gv)}[x := sign(l)]ΠiU {DHSim(Π
i
U ; gv)} if l 6⊆ gv
A SGN3 {DHSec(ΠiU ; y; bv)}[x := sign(l)]ΠiU {DHSec(Π
i
U ; y; bv ∪ {x})} if l ∩ bv 6= ∅
A SGN4 {DHSec(ΠiU ; y; bv)}[x := sign(l)]ΠiU {DHSec(Π
i
U ; y; bv)} if l ∩ bv = ∅
A SGN5 {ϕ}[x := sign(l)]Πi
U
{ϕ} if ϕ is a DHPubIn, DHPubOut or DHSol predicate
Signature
verification
A VFS1 {ϕ}[verisign(l, x)]Πi
U
{ϕ} if ϕ is a DHSec, DHPubIn, DHPubOut, DHSol or DHSim predicate
Concatenation
A CON1 {DHSol(ΠiU ; w; u; v)}[z := concat(x, y)]ΠiU {DHSol(Π
i
U ; z; u; v) ∧ DHSol(ΠiU ; w; u; v)} if w is x or y
A CON2 {DHSol(ΠiU ; w; u; v)}[z := concat(x, y)]ΠiU {DHSol(Π
i
U ; w; u; v)} if w is not x and y
A CON3 {DHSim(ΠiU ; gv)}[z := concat(x, y)]ΠiU {DHSim(Π
i
U ; gv ∪ {z})} if x and y ∈ gv
A CON4 {DHSim(ΠiU ; gv)}[z := concat(x, y)]ΠiU {DHSim(Π
i
U ; gv)} if x or y /∈ gv
A CON5 {DHSec(ΠiU ; x′; bv)}[z := concat(y, x)]ΠiU {DHSec(Π
i
U ; x
′; bv ∪ {z})} if x or y ∈ bv
A CON6 {DHSec(ΠiU ; x′; bv)}[z := concat(y, x)]ΠiU {DHSec(Π
i
U ; x
′; bv})} if x and y /∈ bv
A CON7 {ϕ}[[z := concat(x, y)]Πi
U
{ϕ} if ϕ is a DHPubIn, DHPubOut predicate
Addition
or
Multiplication
A COM1 {DHSol(ΠiU ; w; u; v) ∧ DHSec(ΠiU ; v; bv)}[z := c(x, y)]ΠiU {DHSol(Π
i
U ; z; u; v) ∧ DHSol(ΠiU ; w; u; v)} if w is x and
y /∈ bv, or w is y and x /∈ bv
A COM2 {DHSol(ΠiU ; w; u; v)}[z := c(x, y)]ΠiU {DHSol(Π
i
U ; w; u; v)} if w is not x and y
A COM3 {DHSim(ΠiU ; gv)}[z := c(x, y)]ΠiU {DHSim(Π
i
U ; gv ∪ {z})} if x and y ∈ gv
A COM4 {DHSim(ΠiU ; gv)}[z := c(x, y)]ΠiU {DHSim(Π
i
U ; gv)} if x or y /∈ gv
A COM5 {DHSec(ΠiU ; x′; bv)}[z := c(y, x)]ΠiU {DHSec(Π
i
U ; x
′; bv ∪ {z})} if x or y ∈ bv
A COM6 {DHSec(ΠiU ; x′; bv)}[z := c(y, x)]ΠiU {DHSec(Π
i
U ; x
′; bv})} if x and y /∈ bv
A COM7 {ϕ}[[z := concat(x, y)]Πi
U
{ϕ} if ϕ is a DHPubIn, DHPubOut predicate
Sending A SND1 {DHSim(Π
i
U ; gv)}[send(sentvars)]ΠiU {DHSim(Π
i
U ; gv)} if sentvars ⊂ gv
A SND2 {ϕ}[send(sentvars)]Πi
U
{ϕ} if ϕ is a DHSec, DHPubIn, DHPubOut or DHSol predicate
Receiving A RCV1 {DHSim(Π
i
U ; gv)} [receive(receivedvars)]ΠiU {DHSim(Π
i
U ; gv ∪ receivedvars)}
A RCV2 {ϕ}[receive(receivedvars)]Πi
U
{ϕ} if ϕ is a DHSec, DHPubIn, DHPubOut or DHSol predicate
Table IV
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{DHSim(ΠiP , {})}[R(rsk)]ΠiP
{DHPubIn(ΠiP , rgr) ∧ DHSec(ΠiP , rr, {rr, rsk})
∧ DHSol(ΠiP , rsk, igr1, rr)
∧ DHSim(ΠiP , {igr1, rgr})}
A DHPubOut predicate cannot be established because no
party receives an authenticated public DH value. In fact, the
DH protocol is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack.
Remark 3: Our logic is sound but not complete, since the
axioms cannot cover all possible cases. Thus, if the logic
cannot show the security of a protocol, it does not mean the
protocol is insecure.
VI. IMPROVEMENT BY SYNTACTIC CHECKING
Notice that using our logic, we can only be sure that a
DH public value really belongs to an honest oracle if it is
a public key. Therefore, a predicate DHPubOut may not be
established just by using the logic. Our idea to solve this
problem is that, if a DH public value is signed and verified
in a way that we can always match, then we can be sure that
it is from an honest oracle. We borrow this idea from the
way Hoare logic has been improved to verify communicating
sequential process [7], [8], [9].
Now we describe our syntactic checking algorithm. Given
a list l of variables, let l[t] denote the tth variable in
l (starting from 1). Also, by saying that the value of
a list l equals the value of another list l′, we mean
they have the same number of elements and the value of
elements in the same position are equal. Given a protocol
pi = (I(isk),R(rsk)), two numbers s and p, the checking
procedure syncheck(pi, s, p) runs as follows:
• in every list l that is the input of sign command in I(isk)
and has size s , get l[p];
• if for every such variable l[t], we have
pi |= {DHSim(ΠiU ; ∅)}[I(isk) : ci]Πi
U
{DHPubIn(ΠiU ; l[t])}
then continue, otherwise return false;
• repeat the above process with R(rsk) instead of I(isk);
• return true.
Theorem 3: Suppose we have a protocol
pi = (I(isk) : ci,R(rsk) : cr). Given two arbitrary
numbers s and p, if syncheck(pi, s, p) returns true, then pi |=
{true}[c1;verisign(l′, s); c2]ΠiU {DHPubOut(ΠiU ; l′[p]})
holds for any c1, c2, and the list l′, whose size is s.
Proof: The intuitive idea of this theorem is as follows.
When a fresh party oracle receives a message with a valid
signature, the message must really be from one instance of
its partner. However, the message may have been signed by
an initiator or responder (the adversary is malicious). In both
cases, if there is one message element at a fixed position that
is a DH public value, then the counterpart in the received
message must also be a DH public value. It helps us to
establish a DHPubOut predicate.
Now we describe the proof in more details. Suppose that
ΠiU has executed the code c1;verisign(l
′, s); c2 and is still
I(isk) :
ir := mkDHSec();
igr := mkDHPub(ir);
send(igr);
receive(rgr1, rs1);
ioid, ipid := getIDs();
verisign(ipid, ioid, rgr1, rs1);
is := sign(ioid, ipid, igr);
send(is);
isk := mkDHKey(rgr1, ir);
R(rsk) :
receive(igr1);
rr := mkDHSec();
rgr := mkDHPub(rr);
roid, rpid := getIDs();
rs := sign(roid, rpid, rgr);
send(rgr, rs);
receive(is1);
verisign(rpid, roid, igr1, is1);
rsk := mkDHKey(igr1, rr);
Table VI
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fresh. Let V be the partner of ΠiU . Notice that we assume
our signature scheme is EF-CMA secure.
Firstly, we will show that with overwhelming probability
the value of l′ equals a list signed by an instance of V .
Assume that it is not correct, i.e. with a non-negligible
probability l′ equals no list signed by an instance of V . Now
we can construct an algorithm B that can win the EF-CMA
game with our signature. We do the experiment as normally
with its adversary E except that we use the signing oracle
to sign anything that any instance of V wants to sign. After
ΠiU has executed the code c1;verisign(l
′, s); c2, s must
be a valid signature for l′. However, with a non-negligible
probability l′ equals no list signed by an instance of V , i.e.
signed by the signing oracle. Therefore B wins the EF-CMA
game which is a contradiction.
Now assume that with overwhelming probability the value
of l′ equals a list signed by an instance of V . Because to
be equal, two lists must have the same number of elements,
we consider only a set sl of signed lists that have the same
size with l′. According to the condition, for every element
e at a position p in every list in sl, the value of e must
equal a DH public value generated by the party oracle that
contains e. Thus, the value of l′[p] must equal a DH public
value generated in one instance of V . It means that pi |=
{true}[c1;verisign(l′, s); c2]ΠiU {DHPubOut(ΠiU ; l′[p]}).
Example 4: This technique can be applied for a modified
STS protocol [20] specified in Table VI. Using the proof
system in the Section V, we conclude:
• pimSTS |= {DHSim(ΠiU ; ∅)}[I(isk) : ci]ΠiU{DHSim(ΠiU ; {igr, rgr1, rs1, ioid, ipid, is}) ∧
DHSol(ΠiU ; isk; rgr1; ir) ∧ DHPubIn(ΠiU ; igr)}.
• pimSTS |= {DHSim(ΠiU ; ∅)}[R(rsk) : cr]ΠiU{DHSim(ΠiU ; {igr1, rgr, roid, rpid, rs, is1}) ∧
DHSol(ΠiU ; rsk; igr1; rr) ∧ DHPubIn(ΠiU ; rgr)}.
These statements are not enough to conclude security
because some DHPubOut predicates are missing. Now we
try to establish them. By syntactically checking, we find
that {ioid, ipid, igr} and {roid, rpid, rgr} are the only
lists signed in the initiator and responder codes respectively.
Also, the sizes of these lists are 3, and igr and rgr are
in the position 3 in each list. Furthermore, pimSTS satisfies
{DHSim(ΠiU ; ∅)}[I(isk) : ci]ΠiU {DHPubIn(ΠiU ; igr)} and{DHSim(ΠiU ; ∅)}[R(rsk) : cr]ΠiU {DHPubIn(ΠiU ; rgr)}
also. According to Theorem 3, we have pimSTS satisfies
{true}[c1;verisign(l′, s); c2]ΠiU {DHPubOut(ΠiU ; l′[3]})
holds for any c1 and c2, and l′, whose size is 3. Fortunately,
there is a command verisign(ipid, ioid, rgr1, rs1);
in I(isk) : ci and verisign(rpid, roid, igr1, is1); in
R(rsk) : cr. Thus, finally we have
• pimSTS |= {DHSim(ΠiU ; ∅)}[I(isk) : ci]ΠiU{DHSim(ΠiU ; {igr, rgr1, rs1, ioid, ipid, is}) ∧
DHSol(ΠiU ; isk; rgr1; ir) ∧
DHPubOut(ΠiU ; rgr1)}.
• pimSTS |= {DHSim(ΠiU ; ∅)}[R(rsk) : cr]ΠiU{DHSim(ΠiU ; {igr1, rgr, roid, rpid, rs, is1}) ∧
DHSol(ΠiU ; rsk; igr1; rr) ∧
DHPubOut(ΠiU ; igr1)}.
Conclusion: According to Theorem 2, these results
imply that the security of pimSTS in the cNR–mBR model
is reducible to the CDH problem. Furthermore, according to
Theorem 1, the security of the compiled version of pimSTS
is reducible to the GDH problem.
Remark 4: We are not aware of any security proof for the
original protocol pimSTS in the BR model, although it has
been done with the CK model [21]. However, notice that the
compiled version of pimSTS here is a bit different from the
original one, since the partnering information is added and
the session key is hashed.
VII. IMPLEMENTING AN AUTOMATED TOOL
The automatic verification procedure presented in this
paper has been implemented. Given two algorithms, in-
cluding the initiator and responder codes, we check if the
conditions are met or not by reasoning on the Hoare-style
logic forwardly. After reasoning with the logic, the tool will
conduct the syntactic checking to make the final conclusion.
Reasoning on Hoare-style logics can be fully automated.
Also, our syntactic check can be implemented easily. Thus,
the tool is fully automated, i.e. without any guidance. For an
algorithm, the verification is likely exponential in the number
of commands. However, a typical protocol has approxi-
mately ten lines of codes, so the verification can be done
very efficiently. The output is printed in LATEXand compiled
to a pdf file. It makes the proof readable and checkable
by human. The tool is available in the author’s website:
http://www.isi.qut.edu.au/research/projects/dhverif.zip.
Notice that the tool can only produce security proofs in the
cNR–mBR model. Security proofs in the BR model is then
established by the modular proof. The tool has been tested
with KEA [22], Modified STS[20], MTI A(0) [23], Unified
Model [24], ISO-9798-3 [25] and “no hashing” version of
protocol 3 and 4 of [19]. We believe there are still more
suitable protocols that can be tested.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have developed a method for verifying security of
Diffie–Hellman-based key exchange protocols. The method
includes a Hoare-style logic and an additional syntactic
check. The logic is computationally sound but not com-
plete. We also implemented the tool and tested it success-
fully.Although our work focused only on Diffie–Hellman
key exchange in the BR model, the method can be extended
to a larger class of protocols or to a different model.
There are some future directions to extend the work.
Firstly, we may cover more Diffie–Hellman–based protocols
like Naxos [17] or HMQV [18], which use Diffie–Hellman
schemes in a different way that is not considered here. This
direction may also include extension of commands, e.g.
allowing parties to hash, XOR, etc. Secondly, the method
can be extended to other types of key exchange, such as
RSA–based ones, because the modular proof of Kudla and
Paterson [6] is still applicable in that case. Thirdly, the
syntactic checking can be improved, e.g. involving type
information. Fourthly, another modular proofs could be
considered, e.g. CK model [21]. Finally, the predicate could
be revised in order to have tighter proofs or even allow exact
security, although it would reduce the simplicity of the logic.
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APPENDIX A.
THE SOUNDNESS OF THE AXIOMS
We prove the soundness of axioms. Due to the obvious-
ness of most of axioms, we only sketch the proofs.
1) Nonce generation:
• (A NG1)
{true}[x := mkDHSec()]ΠiU {DHSec(Π
i
U ; x; {x})}
Proof: It is obvious because the semantics of the
command mkDHSec(), which generates a new nonce for
x. And also, because x has just been created, x is the only
variable that cannot be computed without knowing x.
• (A NG2) {ϕ}[x := mkDHSec()]ΠiU {ϕ} if ϕ is
a DHPubIn, DHPubOut, DHSol, DHSim predicate, or
DHSec(ΠiU ; x
′; bv) where x′ is not x.
Proof: Because x is a new variable, this command
cannot affect ϕ if it is a DHPubIn, DHPubOut or DHSol
predicate. If ϕ = DHSec(ΠiU ; x
′; bv) where x′ is not x, then
ϕ still holds because x is still computable when only x′ is
missing. On the other hand, this command does not send out
any message, therefore it cannot affect any DHSim predicate.
2) DH public value generation:
• (A PVG1)
{DHSec(ΠiU ; x; bv)}[y := mkDHPub(x)]Πi
U
{DHPubIn(ΠiU ; y)∧
DHSec(ΠiU ; x; bv)}
Proof: DHSec(ΠiU ; x; bv) continues to hold because
this command just generates a new variable, and y /∈ bv
because the value of y must be recorded into T according
to the semantics of the command. On the other hand,
DHPubIn(ΠiU ; y) holds according to the semantics of the
command and the predicate.
• (A PVG2)
{DHSim(ΠiU ; gv)}[y := mkDHPub(x)]Πi
U
{DHSim(ΠiU ; gv ∪ {y})}
Proof: This command does not send out any message,
therefore the is no problem with computing any sent mes-
sage. In addition, the value of y must be recorded into T
according to the semantics of the command, so y must be
added into gv.
• (A PVG3) {ϕ}[y := mkDHPub(x)]ΠiU {ϕ} if ϕ is a
DHSec, DHPubIn, DHPubOut or DHSol predicate.
Proof: Notice that y is a new variable, therefore the
command cannot affect any DHPubIn, DHPubOut, DHSol
predicate. In addition, y cannot be in any set bv in any
DHSec(ΠiU ; x; {bv}) predicate, because its value is a DH
public value. Thus, the command cannot affect any DHSec
either.
3) DH key generation:
• (A KG1)
{DHSec(ΠiU ; x; bv)}[z := mkDHKey(y, x)]Πi
U{DHSec(ΠiU ; x; bv ∪ {z}) ∧ DHSol(ΠiU ; z; y; x)}
Proof: Because x must be in bv, z must be added
into bv, i.e. z cannot be computed without x. And
DHSol(ΠiU ; z; y; x) holds according to the semantics of the
command and the definition of the predicate.
• (A KG2)
{DHSim(ΠiU ; gv)}[z := mkDHKey(y, x)]ΠiU{DHSim(ΠiU ; gv ∪ {z})} if x, y ∈ gv
Proof: DHSim(ΠiU ; gv ∪ {z}) holds because this com-
mand does not send out any message, and when x, y ∈ gv
then z must be added into gv (since x, y contain enough
information for computing z).
• (A KG3) {ϕ}[z := mkDHKey(y, x)]ΠiU {ϕ} if ϕ is a
DHPubIn, DHPubOut, DHSol, DHSim(ΠiU ; gv) predicate,
where x /∈ gv or DHSec(ΠiU ; x′; bv), where x′ is not x .
Proof: Since z is a new variable, any DHPubIn,
DHPubOut, DHSol predicate is not affected. Because
this command does not send out any message and x /∈
gv, DHSim(ΠiU ; gv) still holds without changing its gv.
If ϕ is a DHSec(ΠiU ; x
′; bv), where x′ is not x, then
DHSec(ΠiU ; x
′; bv) is not affected because x′ is independent
from x.
4) Getting the static public and secret key:
• (A GSK1)
{true}[y, x := getStaticDHKey()]ΠiU {DHSec(ΠiU ; x; {x})∧ DHPubOut(ΠiU ; y)}
• (A GSK2)
{DHSim(ΠiU ; gv)}[y, x := getStaticDHKey()]ΠiU{DHSim(ΠiU ; gv ∪ {y})}
• (A GSK3) {ϕ}[y, x := getStaticDHKey()]ΠiU {ϕ} if
ϕ is a DHPubIn, DHPubOut, DHSol or DHSec(ΠiU ; x
′; bv)
where x′ is not x predicate.
Proof: Proofs for these axioms are similar to proofs
for nonce generation. However, in this case we establish a
new predicate DHPubOut(ΠiU ; y) because the value of y is
actually the public key of ΠiU ’s partner.
5) Getting IDs:
• (A GID1)
{DHSim(ΠiU ; gv)}[x, y := getIDs()]ΠiU{DHSim(ΠiU ; gv ∪ {x, y})}
Proof: Since the IDs of the oracle and its partner are
in pubinf , DHSim still holds, but x, y are added into gv.
• (A GID2) {ϕ}[x, y := getIDs()]ΠiU {ϕ} if ϕ is a DHSec,
DHPubIn, DHPubOut or DHSol predicate.
Proof: Because this command assigns values to new
variables from pubinf , it does not affect any DHSec,
DHPubIn, DHPubOut or DHSol predicate.
6) Signing:
• (A SGN1)
{DHSim(ΠiU ; gv)}[x := sign(l)]ΠiU {DHSim(ΠiU ; gv ∪ {x})}
if l ⊆ gv.
Proof: DHSim continues to hold because the command
does not send any message. In addition, if l ⊆ gv then x
can also be computed without the generate nonces.
• (A SGN2)
{DHSim(ΠiU ; gv)}[x := sign(l)]ΠiU {DHSim(ΠiU ; gv)} if
l 6⊆ gv.
Proof: Like the proof above, DHSim still holds. But in
this case we cannot guarantee to be able to compute x
• (A SGN3)
{DHSec(ΠiU ; y; bv)}[x := sign(l)]Πi
U
{DHSec(ΠiU ; y; bv ∪ {x})}
if l ∩ bv 6= ∅.
Proof: This command just creates a new variable x, so
DHSec still holds. However, if there is any variable in l is
in bv, then we do not know how to compute x, i.e. x is
added into bv.
• (A SGN4)
{DHSec(ΠiU ; y; bv)}[x := sign(l)]ΠiU {DHSec(ΠiU ; y; bv)}
if l ∩ bv = ∅.
Proof: This command just creates a new variable x, so
DHSec still holds. If there is no variable in l is in bv, then
we can compute x, i.e. bv is still the same.
• (A SGN5) {ϕ}[x := sign(l)]ΠiU {ϕ} if ϕ is a DHPubIn,
DHPubOut or DHSol predicate.
Proof: This command just creates a new variable x,
so it does not affect any DHPubIn, DHPubOut or DHSol
predicate.
7) Verifying signature:
• (A VFS1) {ϕ}[verisign(l, x)]ΠiU {ϕ} if ϕ is a DHSec,
DHPubIn, DHPubOut, DHSol or DHSim predicate.
Proof: The only one variable that this command may
affect is rejected, which has been created in the beginning.
Therefore, any ϕ continue to hold with no change.
8) Concatenation:
• (A CON1)
{DHSol(ΠiU ; w; u; v)}[z := concat(x, y)]Πi
U
{DHSol(ΠiU ; z; u; v) ∧
DHSol(ΠiU ; w; u; v)}if w is x or y.
Proof: DHSol(ΠiU ; w; u; v) still holds because this com-
mand does not affect any of its variables. But we have a
new predicate: DHSol(ΠiU ; z; u; v), because given z we can
always extract w with an overwhelming probability.
• (A CON2)
{DHSol(ΠiU ; w; u; v)}[z := concat(x, y)]Πi
U
{DHSol(ΠiU ; w; u; v)}
if w is not x and y
Proof: Like A CON1, DHSol(ΠiU ; w; u; v) continues to
hold.
• (A CON3)
{DHSim(ΠiU ; gv)}[z := concat(x, y)]Πi
U
{DHSim(ΠiU ; gv ∪ {z})}
if x and y ∈ gv.
Proof: Because x and y ∈ gv, i.e. we can compute
them, so z is added into gv because we can also compute
z.
• (A CON4)
{DHSim(ΠiU ; gv)}[z := concat(x, y)]ΠiU {DHSim(ΠiU ; gv)}
if x or y /∈ gv.
Proof: Because x or y /∈ gv, so we do not know how
to compute z without the generated nonces. Therefore gv is
not changed.
• (A CON5)
{DHSec(ΠiU ; x′; bv)}[z := concat(y, x)]ΠiU{DHSec(ΠiU ; x′; bv ∪ {z})} if x or y ∈ bv.
Proof: Because x or y ∈ bv, we do not know how to
compute z without knowing x′. Therefore, z is added into
bv. x′ and x may or may not be the same variable.
• (A CON6)
{DHSec(ΠiU ; x′; bv)}[z := concat(y, x)]Πi
U
{DHSec(ΠiU ; x′; bv})}
if x and y /∈ bv.
Proof: When both x and y /∈ bv, i.e. we can compute
both of them without knowing x′. In this case, x′ and x must
not be the same variable.
• (A CON7) {ϕ}[[z := concat(x, y)]ΠiU {ϕ} if ϕ is a
DHPubIn, DHPubOut predicate.
Proof: Since this command just creates a new variable
z, it cannot affect any DHPubIn or DHPubOut predicate.
9) Addition or Multiplication: In the following axioms,
the command c can be add or multiply.
• (A COM1)
{DHSol(ΠiU ; w; u; v) ∧ DHSec(ΠiU ; v; bv)}[z := c(x, y)]ΠiU{DHSol(ΠiU ; z; u; v)∧DHSol(ΠiU ; w; u; v)} if w is x and y /∈
bv, or w is y and x /∈ bv.
• (A COM2)
{DHSol(ΠiU ; w; u; v)}[z := c(x, y)]ΠiU {DHSol(ΠiU ; w; u; v)}
if w is not x and y.
• (A COM3)
{DHSim(ΠiU ; gv)}[z := c(x, y)]ΠiU {DHSim(ΠiU ; gv ∪ {z})}
if x and y ∈ gv.
• (A COM4)
{DHSim(ΠiU ; gv)}[z := c(x, y)]ΠiU {DHSim(ΠiU ; gv)} if x
or y /∈ gv.
• (A COM5)
{DHSec(ΠiU ; x′; bv)}[z := c(y, x)]Πi
U
{DHSec(ΠiU ; x′; bv ∪ {z})}
if x or y ∈ bv.
• (A COM6)
{DHSec(ΠiU ; x′; bv)}[z := c(y, x)]Πi
U
{DHSec(ΠiU ; x′; bv})}if x
and y /∈ bv.
• (A COM7) {ϕ}[[z := concat(x, y)]ΠiU {ϕ} if ϕ is a
DHPubIn, DHPubOut predicate.
Proof:
The proofs are similar to the proofs for concatenation.
However, it is a bit more complex with the axiom A COM1.
In this axiom, if DHSol(ΠiU ; x; u; v) holds, then we need to
be able to compute y without knowing v. The reason is that
it helps to extract x from z. Notice that if z := c(x, y), there
exists a PPT algorithm to extract x given z and y. In the
case of addition, it is simple by subtracting y from z. In
the case of multiplication, we can do it by computing the
inverse of y.
10) Sending:
• (A SND1)
{DHSim(ΠiU ; gv)}[send(sentvars)]ΠiU {DHSim(ΠiU ; gv)}
if sentvars ⊂ gv
Proof: The proof works inductively. A DHSim holds
only when we can compute any sent message using the
public information and the part before the message in the
transcript. For any sent message before this command, it
is possible because DHSim(ΠiU ; gv) holds for the state
distribution before this command. Because sentvars ⊂ gv,
everything in sentvars can also be computed as well.
• (A SND2) {ϕ}[send(sentvars)]ΠiU {ϕ} if ϕ is a DHSec,
DHPubIn, DHPubOut or DHSol predicate.
Proof: Since the command sends information out and
does not change any variable, any DHSec, DHPubIn,
DHPubOut or DHSol predicate is not affected.
11) Receiving:
• (A RCV1)
{DHSim(ΠiU ; gv)}[receive(receivedvars)]ΠiU{DHSim(ΠiU ; gv ∪ receivedvars)}
Proof: Because ΠiU just receives more information, the
DHSim still holds, but gv must be extended to include
receivedvars.
• (A RCV2) {ϕ}[receive(receivedvars)]ΠiU {ϕ} if ϕ is
a DHSec, DHPubOut or DHSol predicate.
Proof: Since the command receives information, i.e.
creates new variables, and does not change any previous one,
any DHSec, DHPubIn, DHPubIn, DHPubOut or DHSol
predicate is not affected.
